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In an effort to protect the exercise of free speech and petitioning activity
against meritless defamation suits, numerous states have enacted laws to deter
“SLAPP”—“strategic lawsuit against public participation”—suits.1 Such
strike suits often involve speech on matters of public concern and would have
no practical chance of prevailing under current First Amendment doctrine.2
However, the time and expenses associated with getting these claims
dismissed are often enough to intimidate would-be speakers into silence.
State “anti-SLAPP” laws require the plaintiff to demonstrate a likelihood
of success on the merits for speech-related tort claims, providing a quick and
easy way for defendants to get meritless claims dismissed at the pleadings stage,
prior to potentially costly discovery.3 Because these anti-SLAPP motions spare
defendants a great deal of time and expense, they help blunt the threat of SLAPP
suits. But debates within the federal courts of appeals may jeopardize the
effectiveness of anti-SLAPP statutes. In 2015, the D.C. Circuit created a circuit
split by refusing to apply Washington, D.C.’s anti-SLAPP statute, claiming it
conflicts with Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss and Rule 56 summary
judgment motions.4
The anti-SLAPP circuit split now offers the Supreme Court a unique
opportunity to correct the broader confusion over the relationship between the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and state laws. By holding that anti-SLAPP
statutes do not conflict with the Federal Rules based on an analysis of the
purposes underlying both provisions, the Supreme Court could go a long way in
clarifying how the Federal Rules operate.5 Under the Rules Enabling Act, the
Federal Rules will control litigation in federal courts—provided that they do not
“abridge, enlarge or modify” substantive rights given by law.6 But just what
constitutes a substantive right has vexed judges and academics since the Enabling
Act’s inception in the 1930s. It was this same confusion that led the D.C. Circuit
to conclude that Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 preclude the operation of anti-SLAPP
1
2

Cuba v. Pylant, 814 F.3d 701, 704 n.1 (5th Cir. 2016).
See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 14 (1990) (requiring “public figures” and
“public officials” to show actual malice in libel or slander suits (quoting Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130, 134 (1967))); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 337 (1974) (explaining that a
“public figure” is anyone who is “intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions
or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at large” (citation omitted));
see also Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986) (requiring the plaintiff to “bear
the burden of showing falsity, as well as fault, before recovering damages” in defamation suits against
media defendants); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984) (holding
that appellate courts should “make an independent examination of the whole record” to ensure that
a judgment does not impermissibly intrude on protected free speech).
3 See infra notes 12–17 and accompanying text.
4 Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
5 See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1949) (examining the
policies underlying Rule 23 vis-à-vis a state provision to conclude that the two do not conflict).
6 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012).
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statutes in federal court. However, by treating the question of whether the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure preclude state-law protections in federal court as
one akin to preemption, as Professors Stephen Burbank and Tobias Barrington
Wolff have advocated,7 a more coherent answer to the anti-SLAPP-application
problem is possible.
As this Comment will argue, there is no sufficiently strong federal interest
in having the Federal Rules “preempt” the operation of anti-SLAPP
protections in federal court. Instead, straightforward preemption analysis
shows that the balance favors having anti-SLAPP motions available to federal
litigants. Part I examines the particulars of anti-SLAPP statutes and the
circuit split over whether anti-SLAPP statutes apply in federal diversity
proceedings. Part II then provides context for the anti-SLAPP-application
debate by reviewing the Supreme Court’s conflicting interpretations of the
Enabling Act. Part III examines Enabling Act precedent through the lens of
preemption analysis, which provides a more coherent explanation for when
the Court is likely to find that the operation of the Federal Rules supersedes
state law. Based on insights gathered from the preemption-analysis approach,
Part IV considers the use of anti-SLAPP motions in federal court. Finally,
this Comment concludes that no conflict exists between federal interests and
anti-SLAPP provisions. Thus, anti-SLAPP motions should be available to
defendants in federal court.
I. ANTI-SLAPP STATUTES AND THE QUESTION THEY POSE IN
FEDERAL DIVERSITY LITIGATION
Prompted by concerns that the prospect of litigating meritless claims may
discourage protected speech or petitioning activity, approximately thirty
states, territories, and the District of Columbia have enacted anti-SLAPP
statutes.8 An additional two states, Colorado and West Virginia, adopted
anti-SLAPP protections by judicial decision.9 The policy undergirding these
anti-SLAPP provisions is to protect against the filing of state slander, libel,
and other speech-related claims meant to chill the exercise of free speech and
petitioning activity.10 The fear is that potential speakers will be so intimidated

7
8

See infra note 45.
State Anti-SLAPP Laws, PUB. PARTICIPATION PROJECT, https://www.anti-slapp.org/yourstates-free-speech-protection/ [https://perma.cc/V7LH-BV6C].
9 Protect Our Mountain Env’t, Inc. v. Dist. Court, 677 P.2d 1361, 1368-69 (Colo. 1984); Harris
v. Adkins, 432 S.E.2d 549, 552 (W. Va. 1993).
10 See Atlanta Humane Soc’y v. Harkins, 603 S.E.2d 289, 292 (Ga. 2004) (“[T]he purposes of
Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute are to encourage citizen participation in matters of public significance
through the exercise of the right of free speech and the right to petition the government for redress of
grievances, and to prevent their valid exercise from being chilled through abuse of the judicial process.”).
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by the burden and expense of litigating these claims, they will refrain from
engaging in protected speech.11
Anti-SLAPP statutes do not preclude speech-related suits. Rather, they
create special motions to dismiss actions brought against defendants based on
“any claim arising from an act in furtherance of the right of advocacy on issues
of public interest.”12 To succeed, the defendant must make a “prima facie
showing that the claim at issue arises from an act in furtherance of the right
of advocacy on issues of public interest.”13 The burden then falls on the
plaintiff to demonstrate that “the claim is likely to succeed on the merits.”14 If
the plaintiff succeeds, the motion is denied; otherwise, the defendant’s motion
to dismiss is granted.15 To keep costs to the defendant low, discovery is stayed
during the pendency of the motion.16 If the motion is granted, the defendant
can then seek costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.17
Proponents of anti-SLAPP statutes argue that they protect substantive
rights—free speech and advocacy, without fear of reprisal through costly
litigation—via targeted procedural means.18 But recently, federal circuits have
11 See EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES 118 (5th ed.
2014) (explaining how anti-SLAPP statutes “try to decrease the ‘chilling effect’ of certain kinds of
libel litigation and other speech-restrictive litigation”).
12 D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-5502(a) (West 2012); see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556
(2012) (“When a moving party asserts that the civil claims . . . are based on the moving party’s
exercise of the moving party’s right of petition under the Constitution of the United States or the
Constitution of Maine, the moving party may bring a special motion to dismiss.”).
13 D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-5502(b) (West 2012).
14 D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-5502(b) (West 2012); see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1)
(West 2015) (stating that the plaintiff must establish “that there is a probability that the plaintiff will
prevail on the claim”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2012) (“The court shall grant the special
motion, unless the party against whom the special motion is made shows that the moving party’s
exercise of its right of petition was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in
law and that the moving party’s acts caused actual injury to the responding party.”).
15 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-5502(b) (West 2012).
16 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(g) (West 2015); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-5502(c)(1)
(West 2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2012).
17 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(c)(1) (West 2015); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-5504(a)
(West 2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2012). Anti-SLAPP statutes also tend to include
interlocutory appeal provisions—raising collateral order doctrine issues. See, e.g., Godin v. Schencks,
629 F.3d 79, 83-85 (1st Cir. 2010) (concluding that appellate jurisdiction exists because deciding the
anti-SLAPP issue would be conclusive to “the disputed question” and distinct from the merits); see
also Breazeale v. Victim Servs., Inc., Nos. 15-16549, 16-16495, 2017 WL 6601779, at *6 (9th Cir. Dec.
27, 2017) (discussing the appealability of decisions on anti-SLAPP motions under California law).
This Comment, however, will leave the collateral order dispute for another day.
18 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a) (West 2015) (“The Legislature finds and
declares that there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid
exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances.
The Legislature finds and declares that it is in the public interest to encourage continued
participation in matters of public significance, and that this participation should not be chilled
through abuse of the judicial process.”).
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divided over whether anti-SLAPP statutes are “procedural” or “substantive”
for Enabling Act purposes. The disagreement centers on whether Rules
12(b)(6) and 56 preclude the operation of the anti-SLAPP motions in federal
proceedings. This debate has now created a circuit split whose ultimate
resolution may come only through Supreme Court review. And in reviewing
anti-SLAPP statutes, the Court would have the opportunity to clarify its own
Enabling Act jurisprudence. The remainder of this Part will briefly survey
some of the more important courts of appeals opinions regarding the place of
anti-SLAPP statutes in federal court.
In Godin v. Schencks, the First Circuit held that Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute
must be applied in federal court.19 A “straightforward reading” of Rules
12(b)(6) and 56, the court said, does not indicate that those Rules were “meant
to control the particular issues.”20 Further, “a Federal Rule ‘cannot govern a
particular case in which the rule would displace a state law that is procedural in
the ordinary use of the term but is so intertwined with a state right or remedy that
it functions to define the scope of the state-created right.’”21
The court went on to hold that Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 do not “address
the same subject” as the anti-SLAPP statute.22 Because the anti-SLAPP
statute addresses “special procedures for state claims,” it does not seek to
displace the “general federal procedures governing all categories of cases.”23
In other words, “Maine has not created a substitute to the Federal Rules,
but instead created a supplemental and substantive rule to provide added
protections, beyond those in Rules 12 and 56, to defendants who are named
as parties because of constitutional petitioning activities.”24 Thus, because
of the substantive purposes behind Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute, distinct
from the functioning of Rules 12(b)(6) and 56, finding a conflict was both
unnecessary and inappropriate.
In contrast to the First Circuit, the D.C. Circuit found a conflict between
D.C.’s anti-SLAPP provision and Rules 12(b)(6) and 56.25 Specifically, the

19
20
21

629 F.3d 79, 92 (1st Cir. 2010).
Id. at 86.
Id. at 87 (emphasis added) (quoting Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 559 U.S. 393, 423 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
22 Id. at 88 (quoting Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 402). The court also emphasized how “the
allocation of burden of proof is substantive in nature and controlled by state law.” Id. at 89.
23 Id. at 88.
24 Id. Specifically, the anti-SLAPP statute provides “a mechanism” for dismissing a complaint
because “the plaintiff cannot meet the special rules Maine has created to protect such petitioning
activity against lawsuits.” Id. at 89. The anti-SLAPP motion is neither testing the sufficiency of the
complaint nor granting judgment in the absence of material facts; Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 do both.
Id. at 88.
25 See Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“Federal Rules
12 and 56 answer the same question as the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act . . . . A federal court exercising
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court viewed D.C.’s anti-SLAPP statute as imposing a higher burden on
getting to trial than Rules 12(b)(6) and 56.26 Under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff
need only show that a claim “is plausible on its face.”27 Indeed, a case “may
proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of the facts alleged
is improbable.”28 Because the anti-SLAPP statute and Rules 12(b)(6) and 56
“answer the same question” about a claim’s viability, but the anti-SLAPP
statute makes getting to trial more difficult for the plaintiff, it conflicts with
the Federal Rules and cannot be applied.29 Thus, from the D.C. Circuit’s
perspective, the Federal Rules and the anti-SLAPP statute cannot coexist.
Other circuits have also seen the anti-SLAPP controversy come to a head.
The Ninth Circuit was the first to hold that anti-SLAPP statutes should apply
in federal court because they “can exist side by side” with the Federal Rules.30
The court noted that if a defendant were unsuccessful in obtaining relief
through the anti-SLAPP motion, he could still bring a Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule
56 motion.31 The anti-SLAPP provision also protects individual
“constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for redress of
grievances,” something the Federal Rules do not directly address.32
Despite this longstanding Ninth Circuit precedent, Judge Kozinski waged
an all-out assault on applying anti-SLAPP statutes in federal court.
Specifically, he viewed anti-SLAPP statutes as impermissible alterations to
the standards set by Rules 12(b)(6) and 56.33 He also believed that the Federal
Rules operate as “an integrated program of pre-trial, trial and post-trial
procedures,” and that anti-SLAPP statutes create “an ugly gash” in the ordinary
diversity jurisdiction therefore must apply Federal Rules 12 and 56 instead of the D.C. Anti-SLAPP
Act’s special motion to dismiss provision.”).
26 See id. at 1334 (discussing how there is a conflict because “the plaintiff is not able to get to
trial just by meeting those Rules 12 and 56 standards”—which “do not require a plaintiff to show a
likelihood of success on the merits”).
27 Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007)).
28 Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
29 Id. at 1336.
30 United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 972 (9th
Cir. 1999) (quoting Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 752 (1980)).
31 Id.
32 Id. at 973 (quoting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a) (West 2015)).
33 See, e.g., Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hirsh, 831 F.3d 1179, 1183-84 (9th Cir. 2016) (Kozinski,
J., concurring) (complaining that the anti-SLAPP’s probability of success standard is much higher than
Rule 12(b)(6)’s plausibility standard: “The plausibility standard isn’t a floor or a ceiling from which we
can depart. Using California’s standard in federal court means that some plaintiffs with plausible claims
will have their cases dismissed before they’ve had a chance to gather supporting evidence. It’s obvious
that the two standards conflict.”); Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 273 (9th Cir. 2013)
(Kozinski, C.J., concurring) (stating that an anti-SLAPP statute “creates no substantive rights,” but only
“provides a procedural mechanism for vindicating existing rights”); id. at 274 (arguing that defendants
can “test the factual sufficiency of a plaintiff’s case prior to any discovery [and get a more favorable]
standard for surviving summary judgment by requiring a plaintiff to show a ‘reasonable probability’ that
he will prevail, rather than merely a triable issue of fact”).
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procedural process.34 Despite his colorful language, Judge Kozinski’s
arguments have not carried the day in the Ninth Circuit.35 But Judge
Kozinski’s views are not outliers. Other circuit judges argue that
anti-SLAPP statutes should not apply in federal courts.36
The debate involving anti-SLAPP statutes is not unique. Rather, it is part
of a broader struggle to understand the relationship between the Federal Rules
and state laws. Much of this misunderstanding persists because the legal
community tries to catalogue issues as “substantive” or “procedural.”37 If it is
a procedural issue, the Federal Rules cover the situation. But if it is substantive,
then state law prevails. However, many laws may not be amenable to clear-cut
labels and categories. Such is the case with anti-SLAPP statutes, which have
substantive aims but use court procedure to further those goals. Truly
understanding whether anti-SLAPP protections should apply in federal court
requires peeling away the labels and looking instead to the policies underlying
the potentially conflicting laws. The next Part will survey the relevant
Supreme Court precedent regarding the Rules Enabling Act. Then, the
following Part will demonstrate a superior way of examining these sorts of
Enabling Act problems.
II. THE CONFUSING SCOPE OF THE FEDERAL RULES
The current confusion surrounding the application of anti-SLAPP
statutes in federal court proceeds from the Supreme Court’s most recent
sojourn into the relationship between the Federal Rules and substantive
rights. The Rules Enabling Act—the federal law that vests the Supreme
34
35

Makaeff, 715 F.3d at 274 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring).
See Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 736 F.3d 1180, 1182 (9th Cir. 2013) (Wardlaw & Callahan,
JJ., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (“Rules 12 and 56 do not provide that a plaintiff is
entitled to maintain his suit if their requirements are met; instead, they provide various theories
upon which a suit may be disposed of before trial. California’s anti-SLAPP statute, by creating a
separate and additional theory upon which certain kinds of suits may be disposed of before trial,
supplements rather than conflicts with the Federal Rules.”).
36 See, e.g., Cuba v. Pylant, 814 F.3d 701, 719-20 (5th Cir. 2016) (Graves, J., dissenting) (stating
that the anti-SLAPP motion’s standards are irreconcilable with Rules 12(b)(6) and 56, and that the
statutes “must yield” to the Federal Rules); Makaeff, 736 F.3d at 1188 (Watford, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 “together . . . establish the exclusive
criteria for testing the legal and factual sufficiency of a claim in federal court” and that anti-SLAPP
statutes “impermissibly supplement[] the Federal Rules’ criteria for pre-trial dismissal of an action”).
37 Judge Kozinski’s analysis was especially problematic because he began by trying to abstractly
characterize anti-SLAPP statutes as “substantive” or “procedural.” Makaeff, 715 F.3d at 273 (Kozinski,
C.J., concurring). Doing so puts the cart before the horse. Looking to the policies underlying the
provisions—within the context of the litigation—to see if they conflict better exposes whether a
provision has more substantive or procedural aims. Regardless, this Comment argues that simply
assigning labels to provisions does not resolve the problem. Examining how the policies underlying
each provision interact is more fruitful. See infra Part IV.
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Court with the authority to promulgate rules of procedure for the lower
federal courts—specifically precludes the operation of rules that “abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right.”38 But discerning what constitutes
an impermissible alteration of substantive rights has not exactly been easy.
Shortly after the Enabling Act went into effect, the Court decided a series
of cases, trying to make sense of challenges to the validity of the Federal
Rules. The Court first clamped down on attempts to contest the application
of the Federal Rules by announcing that a Rule is valid so long as it “really
regulates procedure,—the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and
redress for disregard or infraction of them.”39 Although this test remains the
black-letter question for a Rule’s validity, concerns arose regarding its ability to
insulate just about any provision from real scrutiny—no matter how great its
impact on substantive rights.40 The Court then began to backpedal by limiting
the scope of certain Rules that appeared to conflict with substantive state
laws.41 Then, the Court in Hanna v. Plumer reasserted the “really regulates
procedure” mantra.42 The Hanna Court doubled down on the primacy of the
Federal Rules over conflicting state provisions, emphasizing that the Rules’
purpose is “to bring about uniformity in the federal courts.”43 Thus, unless a
Rule was invalid under the Enabling Act or the Constitution by doing
something other than regulating procedure, it would control regardless of its
impact on substantive rights.44
Although Hanna made clear that assailing a Federal Rule’s validity would
be extremely difficult, it shifted the debate from arguing about a Rule’s impact
to arguing about a Rule’s scope.45 To its credit, the Hanna Court did try to
forestall such scope challenges by instructing courts not to refrain from
applying a Rule just to avoid a “direct collision” with state law.46 However, it
38
39
40

28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012).
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941).
See, e.g., Note, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and the Federal Rules, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1030, 1032-33
(1949) (discussing how certain Federal Rules might be invalid).
41 See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1949) (finding that a
state-required bond for derivative stockholder suits did not conflict with Rule 23); Ragan v. Merchs.
Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533-34 (1949) (holding that the filing of a complaint per
Rule 3 did not toll a state statute of limitations, which required that the defendant be served with
the summons before tolling would begin).
42 380 U.S. 460, 464 (1965) (quoting Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14).
43 Id. at 472 (quoting Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 764 (5th Cir. 1963)).
44 See id. at 471 (instructing that courts can only refuse to apply a Federal Rule if it
“transgresses . . . the terms of the Enabling Act [or] constitutional restrictions”).
45 See Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of
Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 35-36 (2010) (noting that “the Justices sought to clarify the
circumstances in which Hanna’s test for the validity of a Federal Rule . . . would apply”).
46 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472-73.
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was not long before the Court asserted that Hanna’s test would only govern
when “the scope of the Federal Rule in fact is sufficiently broad to control the
issue before the Court.”47 The Rule’s breadth is determined by its “plain
meaning.”48 Most of the Court’s modern cases regarding the Federal Rules are
decisions about the scope of individual Rules. But they often lack any clear or
coherent way to determine that scope, notwithstanding the Court’s
admonition to follow the Rule’s “plain meaning.”49
Then, in 2009, the Court seemed poised to rethink, or at least clarify, how
to handle the relationship between state procedural provisions alleged to
protect substantive rights and the Federal Rules.50 But sadly, the Court’s
fractured decision in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate
Insurance Co. only added to the confusion.51 Three separate opinions offered
competing visions of how to tackle the effect of the Federal Rules on
substantive rights. Justice Scalia, writing for a majority of five Justices,
reaffirmed the post-Hanna test of determining first whether the scope of the
Federal Rule covered the same issue as the state provision, and second—if
applicable—whether the Rule was valid.52 The majority then determined that
a New York provision limiting the ability for class actions to recover under
New York substantive law “attempt[ed] to answer the same question” as Rule
23’s class-action certification procedure.53 Eschewing arguments that the
Court need not find a conflict between the two provisions, the Court read
Rule 23 as providing the exclusive method for determining the viability of a
class action in federal court.54 Hence, according to the Court, the direct
conflict was unavoidable, requiring an examination of Rule 23’s validity.
Justice Stevens, the fifth vote for the majority’s direct-collision analysis,
parted ways with Justice Scalia’s opinion in examining the valid application
of a Federal Rule. Justice Scalia’s plurality maintained that so long as the Rule
can be “rationally capable of classification” as procedural and otherwise does
not “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,” then it is valid.55
47
48
49
50

Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1980); Burbank & Wolff, supra note 45, at 36.
Walker, 446 U.S. at 750 n.9.
Burbank & Wolff, supra note 45, at 35-37.
See id. at 18-21 (noting a “closely watched case” that “presented the Supreme Court . . . with
an opportunity to speak to” the relationship between a “New York law [prohibiting] the award of
penalties or statutory damages on a classwide basis . . . and Federal Rule 23”).
51 559 U.S. 393 (2010).
52 Id. at 398.
53 Id. at 399.
54 Id. at 405-06.
55 Id. at 406-08 (plurality opinion) (first quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965);
then quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006)). In other words, so long as the Rule “governs only ‘the
manner and the means’ by which the litigants’ rights are ‘enforced,’ it is valid; if it alters ‘the rules
of decision by which [the] court will adjudicate [those] rights,’ it is not.” Id. at 407 (alterations in
original) (citation omitted).
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Justice Scalia quickly pointed out that any Federal Rule “regulat[ing] only the
process for enforcing [substantive] rights” would be upheld.56 For Justice
Scalia, any attempt to consider the impact of applying a Federal Rule on a
party’s ability to vindicate a substantive right was too difficult and could lead
to Federal Rules applying in some states, but not others.57
However, Justice Stevens maintained that courts must be “sensitiv[e] to
important state interests and regulatory policies.”58 Justice Stevens proposed that
if a state procedural rule is “intimately bound up in the scope of a substantive right
or remedy,” then courts should either narrowly interpret a conflicting Federal Rule
to avoid its application or just decline to apply the Federal Rule.59
Justice Ginsburg, joined by three other Justices, dissented from the
judgment and from Justice Scalia’s reasoning. Like Justice Stevens, Justice
Ginsburg maintained that interpreting the Federal Rules requires an
“awareness of, and sensitivity to, important state regulatory policies” and that
conflicts with such state policies should be avoided if possible.60 Because of
this agreement between Justices Stevens and Ginsburg—an agreement
comprising five Justices—some courts have maintained that this constitutes a
binding decision of the Supreme Court and must be followed.61
But regardless of the Stevens–Ginsburg agreement’s impact on stare
decisis, their respective disagreement highlights the fundamental problem
that has plagued the Court’s post-Hanna jurisprudence. Justice Stevens
concluded that New York’s class-action provision fell within the scope of Rule
23 and, because the provision was purely procedural, denying its application
did not violate the Enabling Act.62 However, Justice Ginsburg maintained
that there was no collision between Rule 23 and the New York provision.63
Hence, even the five Justices who were sensitive to considering state policies
when interpreting the scope of a Federal Rule divided over how to go about
determining that scope.
The confusion surrounding whether the Federal Rules should supplant
certain state regimes is entirely understandable. Drawing a neat line between
substantive provisions versus purely procedural provisions is nearly impossible
56
57
58

Id. at 407-08.
Id. at 409-10.
Id. at 418 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S.
415, 427 n.7 (1996)).
59 Id. at 423, 433.
60 Id. at 437, 442-43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
61 See, e.g., Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 87 (1st Cir. 2010) (determining that the agreement
requires the court to decide “whether the state law actually is part of a State’s framework of
substantive rights or remedies” before allowing a Federal Rule to control (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 419)).
62 Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 430-31, 435-36 (Stevens, J., concurring).
63 Id. at 446 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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at the margins.64 This confusion makes the Court’s responsibility to expound
clearly and fairly on the scope of the Federal Rules all the more imperative.
Acknowledging that the Court is engaging in something like preemption
analysis helps dispel much of the mystery surrounding Enabling Act
jurisprudence and allows for reconciliation of otherwise conflicting cases.
Preemption analysis can help evaluate the scope of the Federal Rules as
related to state-law regimes because it allows for consideration of the
purposes of each provision.65 And, the Court’s post-Hanna decisions appear
to be consistent with basic preemption analysis. The next Part endeavors to
show how the Court engages in Enabling Act preemption analysis and how
to tease out patterns relevant to the anti-SLAPP question.
III. THE MORE COHERENT PREEMPTION APPROACH
Recognizing that the Court is engaging in a form of preemption analysis
provides a superior means of determining whether given Federal Rules
supersede state provisions, as the analysis takes account of the policies
underlying the two regimes.66 Because the facial validity of a Federal Rule is
almost unassailable, the question of whether the Rule is broad enough to
create a “direct collision” with state law is practically determinative.67 Thus,

64 See Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333,
335 (1933) (“[M]uch of the difficulty arises from the failure on the part of both judges and text writers
to state the problem accurately. Nearly every discussion seems to proceed on the tacit assumption that
the supposed ‘line’ between [substance and procedure] has some kind of objective existence, so to
speak, and that the object is to find out, as one writer puts it, ‘on which side of the line a set of facts
falls.’” (citation omitted)); see also John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693,
725 (1974) (stating a “substantive right” is “a right granted for one or more nonprocedural reasons, for
some purpose or purposes not having to do with the fairness or efficiency of the litigation process”).
65 See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 45, at 37 (“In an interpretive landscape where ‘direct
collisions’ are manufactured, the same language has multiple ‘plain meanings,’ and the governing
precedent (Sibbach) is hopelessly out of step with legal developments, it is no surprise that, since
Walker, the Justices have lurched from one extreme to the other, giving some Federal Rules a scope
of application broader than appears plausible—certainly, broader than necessary to escape a charge
of infidelity to the text—while emptying others of content.”).
66 See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 559 (1949) (Rutledge, J., dissenting)
(“The real question is not whether the separation [of substance versus procedure] shall be made, but
how it shall be made: whether mechanically by reference to whether the state courts’ doors are open or
closed, or by a consideration of the policies which close them and their relation to accommodating the
policy of the Erie rule with Congress’ power to govern the incidents of litigation in diversity suits.”);
see also Burbank & Wolff, supra note 45, at 26 (advocating for an approach that interprets “the Rules’
open-ended text in identifying the source and content of litigation policies in the federal courts”).
67 See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 45, at 36 (discussing how Hanna’s analysis only applies if
the Federal Rule is “sufficiently broad to control the issue before the Court” (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1980))).
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rather than trying to decide whether a Rule is “valid,” the more fruitful
question is whether the Rule’s scope covers the matter at issue.68
This Part first discusses the two types of implied preemption that
generally occur. Then follows an examination of some key post-Hanna cases
and how they utilize the modalities of preemption analysis. Finally, based on
the case analysis, this Part will conclude by describing the patterns that arise.
A. Conflict and Field Preemption
Implied preemption of state law by federal law results when Congress
exercises its authority in a way that precludes state operation.69 There are two
types of implied preemption. The first is “conflict preemption.” Conflict
preemption itself has two subsets. What most people would immediately
recognize as conflict preemption—when state and federal law are
irreconcilable with each other, making it impossible to comply with both
federal and state laws—is the first subset.70 But another less clear-cut facet of
conflict preemption arises when state law “stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.”71 However, preemption is not always a given. If the federal law at
issue involves “the historic police powers of the States,” courts presume that
Congress did not intend to preempt state law.72 Also, if federal law merely
sets a minimum standard and the states impose a more exacting standard,
then there is no conflict.73
The second major category is “field preemption,” which precludes states
“from regulating conduct in a field that Congress, acting within its proper
authority, has determined must be regulated by its exclusive governance.”74
Courts find field preemption either because “the nature of the regulated
subject matter permits no other conclusion, or, that the Congress has
68 And, as Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg would have it, considering whether a Rule
might transgress the Enabling Act’s prohibition on abridging, enlarging, or modifying substantive
rights is considered at the scope stage of the inquiry. Compare Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 422-23
(Stevens, J., concurring) (“When a federal rule appears to abridge, enlarge, or modify a substantive
right, federal courts must consider whether the rule can reasonably be interpreted to avoid that
impermissible result.”), with id. at 442 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“In sum, both before and after
Hanna, the above-described decisions show, federal courts have been cautioned by this Court to
‘interpre[t] the Federal Rules . . . with sensitivity to important state interests,’ and a will ‘to avoid
conflict with important state regulatory policies.’” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
69 See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000) (describing the various
methods Congress can use to preempt state law).
70 Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
71 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
72 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
73 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5.2.4 (4th ed. 2011).
74 Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012).
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unmistakably so ordained.”75 The intent of Congress to supersede state law
altogether may be found from a “scheme of federal regulation . . . so pervasive
as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States
to supplement it.”76
Field preemption often requires courts to engage in policy analysis,
determining whether the federal interests underlying a given scheme “will be
best served by the law being exclusive in a field.”77 In other words, the Federal
Rules must take precedence when state regulations would interfere with
comprehensive federal policy.78 But, preemption is unlikely if the state law in
question serves important state interests.79
Finding “important state interests” can provide a handy escape device for
courts concerned about the impact of a federal scheme on state policies.80
However, if courts believe that applying federal law is important, then
recognizing a comprehensive federal scheme gives ample excuse for
preemption. As the next Section will show, utilizing this preemption analysis
is helpful in understanding the Court’s post-Hanna jurisprudence.
B. Preemption Analysis Applied to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Although the Court does not explicitly apply preemption jurisprudence
to questions regarding the scope of Federal Rules, its confusing array of cases
makes more sense when viewed through a preemption prism. Effectively, ever
since the Court adopted its “really regulates procedure” mantra, most of its
attention has focused on the scope of the Federal Rules, rather than on
questions of validity.81 In crystalizing the “really regulates procedure” test,
Hanna made it nearly impossible to prove that a Rule is invalid. Thus, claims
will almost always rise or fall on the scope of a Federal Rule. Given that scope
is essentially the ballgame, it should come as little surprise that the Court
treats Enabling Act cases like preemption cases. Finding a narrow scope

75 Fla. Lime, 373 U.S. at 142; see also Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 30 (1988)
(noting that state law mandating a particular outcome cannot override Congress’s deliberate decision
to give federal judges discretion “in a single ‘field of operation’” (quoting Burlington N. R.R. Co. v.
Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 7 (1987)).
76 Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
77 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 73, § 5.2.3. Of course, if Congress chooses not to legislate in a
given area, then that question is left to state legislatures. Burbank & Wolff, supra note 45, at 29.
78 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 73, § 5.2.3.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 See supra notes 39–49 and accompanying text. However, as Justice Stevens highlighted in his
Shady Grove concurrence, the analysis of whether a broader reading of a Federal Rule might violate
the Enabling Act counsels interpreting the Rule more narrowly. 559 U.S. 393, 422-23 (2010)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 842, 845 (1999)).
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allows the Court to avoid applying a Federal Rule. Meanwhile, interpreting a
Rule broadly lets the Court choose to supersede state provisions.
Over the past few decades, the Court has built on Hanna’s foundation and
crafted further refinements, many of which typify its preemption
jurisprudence. For example, the Court said that if state and Federal Rules
cannot coexist “side by side . . . each controlling its own intended sphere of
coverage without conflict,” the Federal Rule must control.82 And like
preemption cases, if the Court believes that federal law should prevail, it
determines that the scope of the Federal Rule is broad.83 Conversely, if the
Court believes that important state interests are at stake, it narrowly
interprets the Federal Rule.
1. Enabling Act Avoidance Canon: The Walker Narrow-Read Pattern
Since Hanna, a number of cases have been decided in which the Court
avoids applying the Federal Rules. These cases seem to detract from Hanna’s
“really regulates procedure” test.84 However, when viewed from the
perspective of preemption analysis, these cases make sense as paradigms of
the Court’s determination that important state interests were present.85
The first major case that arose in the wake of Hanna was Walker v. Armco
Steel Corp. Walker dealt with whether Rule 3’s statement—that a lawsuit
commences with the filing of a complaint—preempted state statutes of
limitations that required serving defendants before the limitations period
expired.86 To Court watchers, the case was essentially a rematch. Prior to
Hanna, the Court had held on similar facts that Rule 3 could not control
because doing so would affect substantive rights by giving a claim “longer life
in the federal court than it would have had in the state court.”87 With Hanna
now in the books, the Court had to confront Rule 3’s impact on statutes of
limitations head-on.

82 Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 31 (1988) (quoting Walker v. Armco Steel
Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 752 (1980)).
83 Compare Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 874-76 (2000) (finding that federal
interests counseled reading a regulation broadly to preempt state common law), with Burlington N.
R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1987) (determining that the interests furthered by a Federal Rule
supported applying it broadly to preempt state provisions).
84 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464 (1965) (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1,
14 (1941)).
85 Recall that both conflict and field preemption provide an escape valve for courts concerned
with the impact on state interests. See supra text accompanying notes 72 & 80. In conflict preemption
contexts, the Court presumes that there is no preemption if the state’s police power is implicated.
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
86 446 U.S. 740, 742-43 (1980).
87 Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533-34 (1949).
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Statutes of limitations have proven difficult to classify. Traditional
conflict-of-laws principles considered general statutes of limitations as purely
procedural.88 However, over time, statutes of limitations began to be viewed
as more substantive because of their direct impact on a party’s right to bring
a lawsuit.89 Initially, these concerns led the Court to conclude that Rule 3
could not preempt them.90
After discussing the Court’s previous treatment of Rule 3 and highlighting
the importance of stare decisis, the Walker Court concluded that the scope of
Rule 3 was not broad enough to control a state’s statute of limitations.91 Rather
than being intended to displace state tolling requirements, Rule 3 simply
governed “the date from which various timing requirements of the Federal Rules
begin to run.”92 Thus, the narrowness of Rule 3 allowed it and the state statute
of limitations to “exist side by side . . . each controlling its own intended sphere of
coverage without conflict.”93
An interesting thought experiment would be whether the Court would
find Rule 3’s scope to be the same if the important state interests bound up
in statutes of limitations were removed. However, no such experiment is
necessary.94 Just a few years after Walker, the Court decided West v. Conrail, a
federal question case with tolling provisions governed by federal
regulations.95 One would naturally expect Walker’s view—that Rule 3 did not
directly conflict with a statute of limitations that continued to run until the
defendant was served—would control in West. But the opposite was true.
Rather than adopting the “plain meaning” of Rule 3 as understood by Walker,
the West Court held that “when the underlying cause of action is based on
federal law . . . the action is not barred if it has been ‘commenced’ in
compliance with Rule 3 within the [limitations] period.”96 Hence, the Court

88
89

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 603 (AM. LAW. INST. 1934).
See Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110-11 (1945) (examining statutes of limitations
in light of Erie analysis, and noting “a statute that would completely bar recovery in a suit if brought
in a State court bears on a Statecreated right vitally and not merely formally or negligibly”). But see
Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 727-28 (1988) (upholding a classification of statutes of
limitations as procedural because that is how they were understood at the framing of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause).
90 Ragan, 337 U.S. at 533-34.
91 Walker, 446 U.S. at 750-51.
92 Id. at 751.
93 Id. at 752 (emphasis added).
94 See Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and
Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 701-02 (1988) (explaining the “sleight of hand”
performed by the Court in distinguishing the “plain meaning” of Rule 3 as applied in federal
question cases as opposed to diversity cases).
95 481 U.S. 35, 36-38 (1987).
96 Id. at 39.
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found Rule 3’s “plain meaning” in federal question cases to be exactly the
opposite of what it meant in diversity cases.97
Trying to understand West and Walker as derived only from Rule 3’s “plain
meaning” takes creativity.98 Something other than straightforward “plain
meaning” analysis is going on—something that allows the Court a great deal
of discretion in reaching its conclusion regarding a Rule’s scope.99 Indeed, the
Walker Court’s concern over whether Rule 3 preempted a state statute of
limitations looks like a Court deploying preemption’s “important state
interest” escape valve.100
As later cases have shown, the Walker Court’s narrow construction of a
Federal Rule is not uncommon. More recently, in Semtek International Inc. v.
Lockheed Martin Corp.,101 the Court quite obviously avoided applying a Rule
in a way that could violate the Enabling Act’s restrictions on altering
substantive rights.102 Specifically, the issue was whether preclusion attached
to a claim that was dismissed under Rule 41(b)—such that preclusion would
be binding on state courts. The Court held that Rule 41(b)’s straightforward
statement that a dismissal “operates as an adjudication upon the merits” did
not mean that preclusion necessarily attached.103 The Court stated: “[I]t
would be peculiar to find a rule governing the effect that must be accorded
federal judgments by other courts ensconced in rules governing the internal
procedures of the rendering court itself.”104 As such, the Court read Rule 41(b)
as only barring the refiling of the same claim in the same district court that
produced the original dismissal.105
Semtek is not without criticism.106 But it does demonstrate how the Court
grapples with the underlying goals of the Federal Rules vis-à-vis state laws.
Simply put, there was no clash of policies in Semtek because the Federal Rules
were meant to govern conduct in federal courts, not create preclusion rules for

97
98

Burbank, supra note 94, at 701-02.
See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 45, at 36-37 (exploring the potential inconsistences between
the two cases).
99 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 73, § 5.2.3 (discussing how the Court can mold the scope of
an express preemption provision by Congress through its interpretation).
100 See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 45, at 39 (highlighting Walker as an example of the Court
trying to avoid conflict preemption).
101 531 U.S. 497 (2001).
102 See Burbank and Wolff, supra note 45, at 40 (“Rather than directly confronting those
problems and, in the process, revisiting Sibbach’s impoverished account of ‘substantive rights,’ the
Court engaged in a process that can only charitably be described as interpretation and only in
Wonderland as an exercise in ‘plain meaning’ interpretation.”).
103 Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 506.
106 See, e.g., supra note 102.
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all courts.107 The Court could have found that Rule 41(b) by itself had binding
effect on state rules of decision. But this would have gone well beyond the
Rules’ purpose to act as a uniform system of procedure for federal courts. With
nothing to suggest a clash between state and federal policies, such a broad
reading of Rule 41(b) would have been inappropriate.
In addition to cases like Semtek and Walker, the Court has repeatedly
reaffirmed the pre-Hanna cases limiting the scope of various Federal Rules, and
then has utilized them to support conclusions that given Rules do not preempt
state law.108 This practice of reading federal provisions narrowly to avoid
preemption in situations that would raise questions about those provisions’
underlying validity is neither new nor unique. It mimics the approach taken with
federal legislation that raises constitutional concerns.109 The key point here is that
the Court often narrowly construes the Federal Rules to avoid preempting state
provisions that appear to protect substantive rights.
2. Don’t Tread on Federal Interests: The Burlington Northern
Preemption Pattern
Much of the confusion surrounding the Court’s interpretation and
application of the Federal Rules stems from the Court’s zigzag between strong,
broad application of some Rules, and weak, narrow application of others—as
occurred in Walker.110 Justice Scalia’s application of Rule 23 in Shady Grove is
emblematic of the strong, broad approach, preempting any state provision that
“attempts to answer the same question” of whether a class action can be
maintained.111 In other words, because New York’s class action law added a
restriction on top of Rule 23’s requirements, it directly conflicted with Rule 23
and thus was preempted.112 Yet, we cannot derive a “do not add requirements
on top of the Federal Rules” standard from Shady Grove because other cases
have held exactly the opposite—that state laws can impose additional

107 See Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503-05 (discussing numerous problems with giving Rule 41(b) a
broader reading).
108 See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 428 (1996) (citing Ragan v.
Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533 (1949), in support of a conclusion that New
York’s damages standards should apply); see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res.
Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 213-14 (1983) (finding no preemption between federal
regulations and state laws—even though they involved the same subject matter—because each law
served different purposes).
109 See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991) (declining to read a statute in a way that
would raise constitutional concerns about the federal government’s ability to regulate state-government
actions via the Commerce Clause).
110 See supra notes 91–93.
111 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 399 (2010).
112 Id. at 399-400.
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requirements not included in the Federal Rules.113 While no one can be sure
of how the Court will view the breadth of given Federal Rules, it is still
possible to detect a key pattern from the Court’s more recent cases.
Specifically, if other federal policies support a broader reading of the Federal
Rules, then something akin to field preemption can occur.
Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Woods114 exemplifies a situation where
field preemption explains the Court’s result.115 Specifically, the Court found a
clash between a Federal Rule and a state statute, even though the two did not
directly conflict. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 allowed an award of
damages and costs if the court of appeals determined—at its discretion—that
the appeal was frivolous.116 Meanwhile, an Alabama statute required the court
to impose a penalty if the lower court’s decision was affirmed without
substantial modification.117 However, Alabama also had a separate rule
governing costs for frivolous appeals that was equivalent to Federal Appellate
Rule 38.118 Hence, the statute imposing costs for straight affirmances was not
seeking to punish frivolous appeals. Despite the fact that Federal Appellate
Rule 38 and the Alabama statute targeted two different scenarios, the Court
still found a direct conflict.119
Conventionally, Burlington Northern’s result is difficult to explain,
especially given Walker’s apparent desire to avoid needless conflicts. Yet,
looking at Burlington Northern as engaging in something akin to field
preemption allows for reconciliation.120 Notably, the Court highlighted how
the “cardinal purpose” of the Enabling Act was to authorize “the development
of a uniform and consistent system of rules governing federal practice and
procedure.”121 The Court expressed two concerns with giving a narrow reading
to the Federal Rule in favor of the state statute. First, it emphasized that the
Federal Rule was discretionary, but the state statute was mandatory.122 Second,
113 See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1949) (holding that a
plaintiff could be required to post a bond for derivative stockholder suits per New Jersey law, even
though the Federal Rules did not require such bond).
114 480 U.S. 1 (1987).
115 Burbank and Wolff, supra note 45, at 39.
116 Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 3-4.
117 Id. (citing ALA. CODE § 12-22-72 (1975)).
118 See ALA. R. APP. P. 38 (giving the court discretion to award damages and impose additional
costs for frivolous appeals).
119 Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 7; see also Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S.
88, 100 (1992) (finding field preemption even though the state provisions did not necessarily conflict
with federal regulations).
120 See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 45, at 38-39 (“[W]hereas the Walker Court was preoccupied
by conflict preemption, the Burlington Northern Court was, tentatively and alternatively, suggesting
the possibility of field preemption.”).
121 Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 5 (emphasis added).
122 Id. at 7.
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“the purposes underlying the Rule” were coextensive with those of the state
statute.123 That is, they both occupied the same field of regulations governing
financial incentives regarding appeals.124 In an apparent effort to bolster its
argument, the Court then cited a number of federal rules and statutes
governing costs and penalties relating to appeals.125
But finding a “direct conflict” in a conflict-preemption sense is impossible
in Burlington Northern: the two provisions did not conflict and both could
coexist. Nonetheless, the Court found a conflict. Thinking in terms of field
preemption makes the Court’s decision sensible.126 If the purposes underlying
the various federal provisions conflicted with Alabama’s statute, then
preemption was appropriate.127
The Burlington Northern pattern of finding preemption was repeated in
Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.128 This time, the case involved a contract
with a forum-selection provision.129 Alabama law disfavored forum-selection
clauses, and the district court concluded that the otherwise discretionary federal
transfer provisions gave way to Alabama’s substantive contract law.130 The
Supreme Court disagreed. The Court first asked whether 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
controlled the request for a transfer per the contract.131
After determining that the very purpose of the federal provision was to
give judges discretion in ruling on transfer motions, the Court concluded that
the two provisions occupied the same “field of operation.”132 Specifically, the
Court stated, “Congress has directed that multiple considerations govern
transfer within the federal court system, and a state policy focusing on a single
concern . . . would defeat that command.”133 Alabama’s mandatory provision
made it impossible to “exist side by side” with the discretionary federal
provision; thus, federal law preempted.134

123
124
125
126

Id.
Id.
Id. n.5; Burbank & Wolff, supra note 45, at 38.
However, the Court’s opinion would have been more convincing if it had cited every federal
provision dealing with financial incentives regarding appeals, rather than just a handful. Burbank &
Wolff, supra note 45, at 39.
127 Id. at 39.
128 487 U.S. 22, 30 (1988).
129 Id. at 24.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 29.
132 Id. at 29-30 (quoting Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 7 (1987)).
133 Id. at 31.
134 Id. (quoting Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 752 (1980)).
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As with Burlington Northern, Stewart’s reasoning leaves much to be desired.
It created a conflict where none was apparent.135 And, because there was no
direct conflict, the Court appeared to engage in field preemption, but without
reference to other federal provisions indicating that federal law occupied a
field.136 Had the Court recognized the existence of a federal regulatory
scheme, granting federal judges unhindered discretion in enforcing
contractual agreements despite state law holding the contract’s choice invalid,
the result in Stewart would be more sensible.137 Instead, the Court leaves only
hints that it is engaging in field preemption.138
In short, the Court seems to rely on reasoning akin to field preemption
where it believes federal policy interests favor a broader reading for certain
Federal Rules.139 Hence, if other bodies of federal law exist and seem to have
purposes at odds with state rules, then there is the possibility the Court will
find a conflict through field preemption logic. But absent overarching federal
interests, the Court has fewer means to give a Federal Rule a broader scope.
IV. PREEMPTION OF ANTI-SLAPP STATUTES BY THE FEDERAL
RULES IS UNNECESSARY
Nothing in Rules 12(b)(6) or 56 requires preemption of anti-SLAPP
statutes. In short, the policies underlying each do not conflict. While the
Rules simply establish transsubstantive methods for testing the viability of
cases in general, anti-SLAPP statutes create a special means of handling
unique problems associated with specific state-law claims. Although the two
share commonalities, they do not conflict. And anti-SLAPP statutes thwart
no apparent important federal policy. Thus, there is neither a direct conflict
nor an intrusion into a field occupied by federal interests.

135 See id. at 35-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing how Congress often expects state contract law
to govern issues of contract validity and in the absence of an express preemption provision—as occurred
in the Federal Arbitration Act—it is inappropriate to find a conflict with traditional state contract law).
136 Rather, the Court focused on Congress’s intent to give district judges discretion in handling
transfers under § 1404(a). Id. at 29-30.
137 Cf., e.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 405-09 (2012) (finding that a component of
Arizona’s immigration law—S.B. 1070—interfered with the “federal statutory structure [that] instructs
when it is appropriate to arrest an alien during the removal process” (emphasis added)); City of Burbank
v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638-40 (1973) (finding field preemption where local laws
would interfere with the ability of federal regulators to make decisions based on given circumstances).
138 See, e.g., Stewart Org., Inc., 487 U.S. at 30 (“Our cases make clear that, as between these two
choices in a single ‘field of operation,’ the instructions of Congress are supreme.” (citation omitted)).
139 See Stephen B. Burbank, Case One: Choice of Forum Clauses, 29 NEW ENG. L. REV. 517, 537
(1995) (“With the source of the applicable law turning on what may seem to be the fortuity of federal
lawmaking arrangements, it is an understandable temptation to hear federal statutes or Federal Rules
speaking when they appear to be silent, or at least to hear enough noise nearby to silence state law.”).
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Anti-SLAPP statutes are embedded in substantive concerns about
whether adequate protection exists for defendants in suits involving speech
or petitioning activities.140 Because these statutes protect potential
defendants from abusive litigation, simply writing them off as “state
procedure” and refusing to engage in conflict analysis is inappropriate.141 Like
statutes of limitations, the “policy aspects” of anti-SLAPP statutes must be
analyzed for conflicts with the policies underlying the Federal Rules within
the context of the litigation.142
This Part proceeds by first examining why Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 do not
necessarily conflict with anti-SLAPP statutes. It then analyzes why field
preemption, similar to that in Burlington Northern, would be inappropriate.
Ultimately, these conclusions rest on an examination of whether state and
federal interests conflict, so as to require preemption.143
A. There Is No Direct Conflict Between the Federal Rules and
Anti-SLAPP Statutes
Asserting that anti-SLAPP statutes cannot coexist with Rules 12(b)(6)
and 56 ignores the fact that the policies underlying both do not conflict. As
Semtek and Walker demonstrate, courts must consider the policies behind the
provisions to determine if a direct conflict exists.144 Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 are
procedures for dismissing weak claims. They are meant to work
transsubstantively across various causes of action.145 Their purpose is to
determine as a matter of law whether a party has asserted claims with
sufficient basis to proceed forward.146 In contrast, anti-SLAPP statutes
140
141

See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1949) (explaining that many
rules that lawyers classify as “procedural” actually have important implications beyond procedure and,
hence, must be considered “substantive” in the context of Enabling Act questions). But see Makaeff v.
Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 273 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring) (classifying anti-SLAPP
motions as mere “procedural mechanism[s] for vindicating existing rights”).
142 See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 751-52 (1980) (noting that a rule requiring
actual service on a defendant promotes the policies served by a statute of limitations); see also supra
notes 88–92.
143 See id. at 751-52 (determining that no conflict occurred based on the policies underlying the
federal and state provisions).
144 See supra subsection III.B.1.
145 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1108 (1982)
(discussing how the original understanding of the Enabling Act was that “procedure” meant
establishing rules of court). As rules of court, the Federal Rules cannot create “substantive legal and
remedial rights affected by the considerations of public policy.” Id. at 1121 n.750 (quoting S. REP.
NO. 1190, at 9 (1926)).
146 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2713 (4th ed. 2016) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER]; see also Kevin M.
Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 833 n.47
(2010) (discussing how the “standards of decision . . . for issues of pure law are identical” for both
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establish protections for defendants in specific causes of action. In short,
conflict preemption does not exist because complying with anti-SLAPP
statutes does not abrogate the operation of Rules 12(b)(6) and 56.
Together, Rule 12(b)(6) and 56 motions make the pretrial litigation process
more efficient through “speeding up litigation by eliminating before trial
matters wherein there is no genuine issue of fact.”147 A Rule 12(b)(6) motion
asks the court to determine whether the complaint sufficiently states a claim on
which relief can be granted.148 The motion is judged according to the
plausibility standard: “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”149
Meanwhile, Rule 56 instructs the court to grant summary judgment to the
moving party if there is no genuine issue of material fact left for a jury to decide
and the movant is otherwise entitled to judgment as a matter of law.150 The
motion will come after “a full opportunity to conduct discovery” on the issue.151
By contrast, anti-SLAPP motions are not meant to make the litigation
process more efficient. Instead, their purpose is to curtail harmful litigation.152
Many states have found, as stated by the California legislature, “it is in the
public interest to encourage continued [speech and petitioning activities on]
matters of public significance.”153 Defending against a SLAPP suit can be
costly—the mere threat is often enough to silence a potential whistleblower
or advocate on a public issue.154 Even though the suit is likely meritless, a
deep-pocketed plaintiff can utilize the costs and delays associated with getting
motions and serve gatekeeping functions); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV.
431, 487-88 (2008) (explaining the “weeding out” function of both motions and criticizing their
potentially insurmountable evidentiary requirements for certain plaintiffs).
147 FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee’s notes to the 1946 amendment; see also
FED. R. CIV. P. 12 advisory committee’s notes to the 1946 amendment (stating that the dismissal
occurs when “there is no genuine issue as to any material question of fact and [the moving party] is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law”).
148 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 146.
149 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)).
150 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
151 Id. at 257.
152 See Fustolo v. Hollander, 920 N.E.2d 837, 840 (Mass. 2010) (explaining that the purpose
behind anti-SLAPP statutes is “to provide a quick remedy for those citizens targeted by frivolous
lawsuits based on their government petitioning activities” (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Kobrin v. Gastfriend, 821 N.E.2d 60, 63 (Mass. 2005))).
153 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a) (West 2015); see also Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp.,
691 N.E.2d 935, 940 (Mass. 1998) (describing that the purpose behind Massachusetts’s anti-SLAPP
statute, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 59H (West 2017), was to protect those who choose to speak
and petition publicly from being hit with meritless suits meant to waste time and expense); Opinion of
the Justices (SLAPP Suit Procedure), 641 A.2d 1012, 1014 (N.H. 1994) (listing states that have adopted
anti-SLAPP statutes to protect the exercise of speech and petitioning rights).
154 See, e.g., 2 W. COLE DURHAM & ROBERT SMITH, RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE
LAW § 19:27 (2017) (discussing how SLAPP suits can be tools to “exhaust” speakers “into silence”).
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a case dismissed through the general process to dissuade negative speech.155 By
singling out slander, libel, or other speech-related claims being used to silence
speakers into submission, anti-SLAPP motions protect civic participation.156
As it turns out, states may have good reason to be concerned about
whether the usual dismissal process sufficiently protects defendants from
abusive speech-related suits. Despite the Supreme Court’s recent decisions
making it easier for defendants to dismiss weak claims under Rule 12(b)(6),157 it
is still possible for plaintiffs to sufficiently allege defamation.158 In refusing to
give the District of Columbia’s anti-SLAPP statute effect in federal court, the
D.C. Circuit stated that a claim “may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that
actual proof of the facts alleged is improbable.”159 If the claim survives the Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the defendant then faces the prospect of burdensome
and costly discovery.160 Hence, the usual procedures may not be enough to
protect defendants from abusive suits.
Requiring a plaintiff to show a likelihood of success on the merits to
sustain a claim allows states to give what they perceive as adequate protection
in specific state-law causes of action implicating speech.161 A major mistake
of the D.C. Circuit is its refusal to recognize the important distinctions
between anti-SLAPP motions and motions for dismissal or summary
155 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, for example, required a plaintiff to prove “actual malice”—that the
defendant knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth, spread false information against a “public
official.” 376 U.S. 254, 280-83 (1964); see also Biro v. Condé Nast, 807 F.3d 541, 544-46 (2d Cir. 2015)
(discussing the requirements of alleging actual malice under the current understanding of Rule 12(b)(6)).
156 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a) (West 2015) (emphasizing that public civic
“participation should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial process”).
157 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (holding that to survive a motion to dismiss,
a complaint must state a claim to relief that has facial plausibility, and to be plausible on its face the
complaint must “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged”); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007) (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”).
158 Actually proving these claims and prevailing at trial is a nearly impossible burden for a
plaintiff to meet. See supra note 155; see also Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 456-58 (2011) (affirming
the special protection afforded to speech that involves a “public concern”). But even the more
exacting pleading requirements under Twombly and Iqbal may not be enough to protect defendants.
Courts have continued to find that defamation claims can survive Rule 12(b)(6) motions. See, e.g.,
Intercon Sols., Inc. v. Basel Action Network, 969 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1055-57 (N.D. Ill. 2013)
(determining that Shady Grove precluded applying an anti-SLAPP statute and then holding that the
plaintiff sufficiently alleged actual malice); Heyward v. Credit Union Times, 913 F. Supp. 2d 1165,
1190 (D.N.M. 2012) (finding that the plaintiff, a CEO of a credit union, had sufficiently pleaded
defamation claims against a newspaper).
159 Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
160 And here, Rule 56 would be of little help in minimizing the harm because courts are less
likely to entertain summary judgment motions until substantial discovery has occurred. See supra
note 151 and accompanying text.
161 See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 549-54 (1949) (emphasizing the
importance of state policy seeking to protect defendants from abusive strike suits).
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judgment162—thus ignoring the speech-protecting policies at the heart of
anti-SLAPP statutes.163 Anti-SLAPP motions are not substitutes for
dismissal for failure to state a claim or summary judgment motions.164
Instead, anti-SLAPP provisions create special motions unique to cases
involving speech or petitioning activity. They require the court to decide
whether the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits. Thus, in contrast to
Rule 12(b)(6) and 56 motions, anti-SLAPP motions do not require the court
to analyze whether claims are sufficiently pleaded or enjoy enough support to
leave open genuine issues of material fact.165 In effect, anti-SLAPP statutes
are policy decisions by states to balance the importance of a robust exercise
of constitutional rights, while still providing a channel for legitimate
defamation claims.166 While anti-SLAPP motions do get claims dismissed,
their probability of success standard and their application to specific state-law

162 See, e.g., Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1333-34 (determining that anti-SLAPP statutes only regulate
“procedure” and finding that they “answer the same question” as Rules 12(b)(6) and 56); accord
Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 273 (2013) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring) (characterizing
anti-SLAPP statutes as “procedural” and refusing to analyze their purpose).
163 See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
164 Indeed, the states that have adopted anti-SLAPP statutes still retained their own
equivalents to Rules 12(b)(6) and 56. Compare MD. R. CIV. P. 2-322(b) (West 2004) (regarding
motions for failure to state a claim), and MD. R. CIV. P. 2-501 (West 2015) (regarding motions for
summary judgment), with MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-807(d) (West 2010) (providing
a motion to dismiss or stay proceedings in cases involving SLAPP claims).
165 See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text.
166 Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) (“However pernicious an opinion
may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the
competition of other ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the
intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society’s interest in ‘uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open’ debate on public issues.” (footnote omitted) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 270 (1964))); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572-74 (1942) (stating that
“narrowly drawn and limited” statutes regulating “the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and
the insulting or ‘fighting’ words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace” are constitutional).
Here, any federal constitutional concerns weigh in favor of applying anti-SLAPP statutes.
Doing so helps protect robust free speech. The Court’s decision in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities,
Inc., provides a juxtaposition, where constitutional concerns clashed with applying state law in
federal court. 518 U.S. 415 (1996). There, the Court faced the question of whether applying the New
York state standard for determining excessive jury awards would violate the Seventh Amendment’s
Reexamination Clause. Id. at 434. The Court had held that New York’s standard must apply over
the federal standard because it was substantive. Id. at 429-31. But, it would be a potential violation
of the Seventh Amendment to follow New York’s appellate review method of deciding if the trial
judge erred in determining whether or not the award was excessive. Id. at 438-39. Thus, because of
the clash between constitutional concerns and protecting state substantive rights, the Court
essentially split the difference by saying that the district court would follow the New York standard
for excessive jury awards, but the court of appeals would follow the federal standard for reviewing
the district judge’s decision. Id. Anti-SLAPP provisions, however, raise no such conflict because the
state law does not thwart First Amendment protections.
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causes of action distinguish them from dispositive motions based in the
Federal Rules (and other generic motions in state litigation).167
Finally, there is no direct conflict between anti-SLAPP provisions and the
Federal Rules because it is possible to comply with both.168 Specifically, a
defendant to an anti-SLAPP claim can choose between challenging the
complaint with either a Rule 12(b)(6) motion or an anti-SLAPP motion. If,
hypothetically, the defendant files a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and is denied, he may
still file an anti-SLAPP motion. Meanwhile, Rule 56 summary judgment motions
share very little in the way of proximity to anti-SLAPP motions. Anti-SLAPP
motions would likely be filed at the early stages of a lawsuit—indeed their purpose
is to dismiss a meritless claim quickly to spare the defendant needless expense.169
By contrast, Rule 56 motions are filed much later, after the parties have had a
chance to engage in substantial discovery.170 Thus, no direct conflict exists
between the Federal Rules and anti-SLAPP statutes.
Trying to claim that anti-SLAPP statutes “answer the same question”171
as Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 motions simply because they are dispositive motions
misses the mark. Anti-SLAPP statutes serve the distinct purpose of
protecting defendants in the context of specific state-law causes of action.
They also do not impede the operation of Rules 12(b)(6) and 56. Reading
Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 to avoid a conflict with anti-SLAPP provisions not only
makes sense in the abstract; it is also consistent with Semtek and Walker. In
both cases, the Court felt it necessary to read the Federal Rules in a way that
avoided a direct conflict with important state interests.172 In the anti-SLAPP
context, states have an obvious interest in keeping their tort causes of action
from being misused in a way that implicates individual rights. Thus, finding
that the Federal Rules displace anti-SLAPP statutes on the basis of a direct
conflict would not be in keeping with the Court’s approach to direct conflicts
in Semtek and Walker. Because they are constructed differently and serve two
entirely distinct purposes that do not interfere with each other, anti-SLAPP
statutes do not fall within the same scope as Rules 12(b)(6) and 56.
167
168

See supra note 164.
See Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 736 F.3d 1180, 1181 (9th Cir. 2013) (Wardlaw & Callahan,
JJ., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (finding no “direct collision” between anti-SLAPP
motions and determining that Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 “can exist side by side . . . each controlling its
own intended sphere of coverage without conflict” (ellipsis in original) (quoting United States ex
rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 972 (9th Cir. 1999))); see also Burbank
& Wolff, supra note 45, at 46-47 (explaining that proper application of a Federal Rule does not
necessarily depend on “the putative policies underlying state law,” but more so on how the state law
“interacts with and is implemented by the litigation process”).
169 See supra notes 153-58 and accompanying text.
170 See supra notes 153-58.
171 Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
172 See supra subsection III.B.1.
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B. Anti-SLAPP Statutes Do Not Encroach on a Field of
Important Federal Interests
Having ruled out finding a direct conflict, the other basis for trumping
anti-SLAPP statutes would be through the field preemption approach
exhibited in Burlington Northern. Indeed, Judge Kozinski argued that the
Federal Rules create “an integrated program of pre-trial, trial and post-trial
procedures” and that allowing states to interpose anything upsets the
system.173 But this argument has three flaws. First, it directly conflicts with
Supreme Court precedent that has recognized circumstances where state
provisions can be enforced in federal court.174 Second, it ignores the reality
that federal courts themselves often add to the Rules by implementing local
rules.175 And third, it fails to consider whether Congress intended the Rules
to be so broad as to “occupy the field” in ways that would raise significant
federalism concerns. The remainder of this Section shows why field
preemption is not a compelling conclusion.
The overarching goal of the Enabling Act is to allow for the creation of
uniform rules to govern procedure in federal court. The Federal Rules are
“only superficially uniform and trans-substantive.”176 The “uniformity” that
the Enabling Act sought to provide is a common means for handling civil
cases in federal court.177 Thus, the Enabling Act’s requirements “must be
measured in pragmatic terms, neither fatally undermined by an approach that
focuses on policies underlying state law on the same issue, nor cemented by
jingoistic dogma heedless of the evolving realities of court rulemaking and
litigation practice.”178 Further, the prevalence of local rules and individual
judges’ protocols shows how the Federal Rules are meant to have a flexible
application.179 And no matter how detailed written language is, there will
always be ambiguities and gaps.180 Hence, courts regularly interpret the
173 Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 274 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring).
174 See supra note 113.
175 See infra note 179.
176 Burbank, supra note 94, at 716.
177 Burbank, supra note 145, at 1095-98.
178 Burbank & Wolff, supra note 45, at 48.
179 See Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1677, 1696-98 (2004) (discussing the prevalence of local rules and efforts by Congress to deal

with them); Catherine T. Struve, Institutional Practice, Procedural Uniformity, and As-Applied Challenges
Under the Rules Enabling Act, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1181, 1226-27 (2011) (noting the concern that
local rules “threaten the national uniformity of federal procedure,” but stating that “the myriad local
rules dealing with topics from the trivial to the vital suggest that the federal court system already
tolerates a considerable amount of interstate and even intrastate variation”).
180 Senate committee reports show that members of the Congress that drafted the Enabling Act
were operating under “the notion that the rulemaking power does not extend to ‘matters involving
substantive legal and remedial rights affected by the considerations of public policy.’” Burbank, supra
note 145, at 1121 (quoting S. REP. NO. 1174, at 9 (1926)). But see Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v.
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Federal Rules—just as they would when determining whether preemption
occurs in any other context.
When examining whether federal interests occupy a field, a good place to
start is by asking if the federal government has traditionally played a unique
role in this area.181 The history behind federal court rules cuts both ways.
From 1792 to 1938, Congress instructed the federal courts to follow the rules
of the state in which the court sat for actions at law.182 However, for suits in
equity, Congress recognized the Supreme Court’s authority to promulgate
rules governing federal equity courts.183 These Equity Rules became the
model for the Federal Rules.184
Even conceding that Congress has historically been active in directing the
creation of court rules does not by itself indicate field preemption. This is
because Congress has expressly limited the scope of the Federal Rules to avoid
conflict with substantive law through the Enabling Act.185 The text of the
Enabling Act speaks for itself: the Federal Rules “shall not abridge, enlarge or
modify any substantive right.”186 This express reservation shows that Congress
did not intend to create a comprehensive scheme so pervasive in nature that any
law touching on the same subject matter would be automatically preempted.187

Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 599 (2011) (“[A]s we have said before, Congress’s ‘authoritative statement is
the statutory text, not the legislative history.’” (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs.,
Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005)).
181 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 73, § 5.2.3.
182 Burbank, supra note 145, at 1028, 1037.
183 JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE NEW FEDERAL EQUITY RULES 9 (2d ed. 1918).
184 Indeed, many of the individual Federal Rules derive their substance from the Equity Rules.
See Burbank, supra note 145, at 1166-68. It is even possible to trace Rule 12(b)(6) back to the earliest
version of the Equity Rules, promulgated in 1822. See HOPKINS, supra note 183, at 39-40 (showing the
text of Equity Rule XVIII governing the filing of a demurrer).
185 See Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963) (“The test of whether
both federal and state regulations may operate, or the state regulation must give way, is whether both
regulations can be enforced without impairing the federal superintendence of the field . . . .”).
186 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012).
187 See Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 598-99 (2011) (refusing to
narrowly read a broadly worded savings clause that provided space for state law to operate); see also
Semtek Int’l. Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503-05 (2001) (shying away from
interpreting the Federal Rules to control the extent to which state courts must respect the dismissal
of an action by a federal court because of the potential Enabling Act violation). There is also
precedent for courts withholding the application of Federal Rules when they would interfere with
substantive state laws. See, e.g., Marshall v. Mulrenin, 508 F.2d 39, 41 (1st Cir. 1974) (holding that
the plaintiff had an “absolute right under Massachusetts law” to bring the defendants into the lawsuit
in spite of Federal Rule 15(c)); see also Struve, supra note 179, at 1198-99 (noting the reasoning of the
Marshall court and stating that “a [federal] rule is not to be applied to the extent if any, that it would
defeat rights arising from state substantive law” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Marshall, 508 F.2d at 44)).
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The operation of anti-SLAPP provisions does not interfere with a
comprehensive regulatory scheme. 188 Judge Kozinski would have kept
anti-SLAPP motions out of federal court because he views the Federal Rules
as an integrated code, precluding all supplementation and expansion.189 But
once again, the limits placed by the Enabling Act are instructive. The
Enabling Act calls for federal courts to recognize and respect state regulatory
arrangements that govern “economic and social activity.”190 Few things could
have greater societal implications than the ability to chill free expression
through costly litigation. With an absence of congressional intent to have the
Federal Rules be a closed universe of all possible motions, courts should not
be so quick to preempt the entire field of motions practice—particularly in
circumstances where doing so might mean nullifying substantive rights.191
If the federal government has enacted other laws and regulations touching
on the same subject matter at issue, this weighs in favor of finding field
preemption.192 Following the approach of Burlington Northern, if the federal
government has expressed a desire to regulate free speech and petitioning
activity, it would be more reasonable to read the Federal Rules as precluding
anti-SLAPP motions.193 But, no overarching federal policy appears averse to
states protecting free speech and petitioning by adding procedural protections
that do not conflict with the Federal Rules.194 The anti-SLAPP statutes reflect
the desires of states to protect the robust exercise of constitutional rights in

188
189
190
191

See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 274 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring).
Burbank & Wolff, supra note 45, at 19 (emphasis added).
See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 568-69, 571 (1973) (refusing to find field
preemption when Congress did not express a desire for exclusive federal control).
192 Field preemption would be evident from the “depth and breadth” of legislation that Congress
has enacted regarding an area of law. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001).
193 Cf. Burbank & Wolff, supra note 45, at 39 (discussing how the Burlington Northern–type of
field preemption can occur if other federal policies suggest that a broader reading should be given
to a certain Federal Rule).
194 Indeed, the Court’s Cohen decision shows that the Federal Rules should not be read in a
way that would prohibit states from deterring nuisance-value suits. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1949) (examining a New Jersey statute which went beyond
regulating procedure by creating a new substantive liability). Further, because states have a duty to
abide by the dictates of the First Amendment, through the Fourteenth Amendment, there is strong
reason for them to provide mechanisms that protect their citizens’ speech rights. See Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940) (“The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the
Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public
concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment.”); Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (noting that freedom of speech and of the press “are among the fundamental
personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
from impairment by the States”).
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ways that they see fit. And the Court itself has long recognized that federal
procedural rules should not inhibit states from protecting such rights.195
In short, the purpose of anti-SLAPP statutes is to shield substantive speech
rights by defining and limiting the application of state-law causes of action. They
are not meant to undermine the application of Rules 12(b)(6) and 56. Therefore,
those Rules need not be read to preempt anti-SLAPP protections.196
Finally, precluding the operation of anti-SLAPP provisions in federal
court would raise serious federalism concerns. Preemption of anti-SLAPP
statutes would implicate traditional state interests.197 This consideration
weighs heavily against preemption. Defining the contours and permissibility
of defamation causes of action, like any other tort action, is the traditional
domain of state law. Special procedures unique to these types of suits will
inevitably be “so bound up with the state-created right or remedy that [they]
define[] the scope of that substantive right or remedy.”198 States can
construct their law to allow for quick recognition of the rights protected in
cases like New York Times v. Sullivan, which requires proving actual malice
when a “public official” sues for libel damages—an especially difficult task
for a plaintiff.199 Thus, states should be able to define what constitutes a
viable libel “claim” under their law and likewise prescribe appropriate
mechanisms for deterring nuisance-value suits designed to chill free speech
rather than obtain a judgment.200
Ultimately, our federal system was designed to divide power between the
federal government and the state governments.201 Whenever congressional
action appears to intrude upon the traditional state prerogatives, “it is
incumbent upon the federal courts to be certain of Congress’ intent before

195 See, e.g., Ex Parte Fisk, 113 U.S. 713, 722-23 (1885) (looking to federal policy and
constitutional norms to determine whether state law affecting procedure was preempted).
196 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190,
213-14, 221 (1983) (finding that a California regulatory scheme was not preempted by federal law
because both schemes had different purposes).
197 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
198 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 420 (2010)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
199 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964).
200 See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 418 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The Enabling Act’s limitation
does not mean that federal rules cannot displace state policy judgments; it means only that federal
rules cannot displace a State’s definition of its own rights or remedies.” (emphasis added)).
201 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 459 (1991) (“Just as the separation and independence of
the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power
in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will
reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.”); see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514
U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Federalism was our Nation’s own discovery. The Framers
split the atom of sovereignty. It was the genius of their idea that our citizens would have two political
capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other.”).
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finding that federal law overrides.”202 Making state speech-protecting
provisions relating to tort claims inoperable in federal diversity suits would
bring the Rules Enabling Act into perilous conflict with important, traditional
state interests. Just as with any other federal statute, courts should presume that
Congress has not intended to interfere with the historic powers of the states
absent some plain statement.203 Nothing on the face of the Enabling Act
suggests the intent to intrude upon how states handle matters relating to the
speech and petitioning activity of their citizenry.204 Thus, considering that
Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 need not be read to preempt anti-SLAPP provisions,
courts should read them not to conflict, and hence avoid raising troubling
Enabling Act and federalism questions.
As the First and Ninth Circuits have held, Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 can be
read harmoniously with anti-SLAPP statutes because all three of them
answer different questions.205 Nothing in the Enabling Act forbids states
from cabining their causes of action. To the contrary, the Federal Rules are
not meant to regulate state-law claims.206 For to do so would be a regulation
of substantive rights—a violation of the Enabling Act’s very text. Thus, the
First and Ninth Circuits were correct to avoid reading the Federal Rules in a
way that would generate a conflict with anti-SLAPP provisions.
V. CONCLUSION
The irony of ironies is that in the name of “Erie analysis,” the D.C. Circuit sets
the federal court up as being far more favorable to certain parties than the state
court sitting across the street.207 Denying the application of anti-SLAPP statutes
202
203

Gregory, 501 U.S. at 459.
Id. at 461 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). For a broader
discussion of applying federalism canons to Enabling Act questions involving historic state-police
powers, see generally Margaret S. Thomas, Constraining the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Through
the Federalism Canons of Statutory Interpretation, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 187 (2013).
204 Indeed, if anything, the Enabling Act’s instruction that Federal Rules “shall not abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right” should serve as a signal that Congress did not intend to
intrude on the traditional domain of state-tort law. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012); see supra note 187 and
accompanying text.
205 See Makaeff v. Trump Univ., 736 F.3d 1180, 1182 (9th Cir. 2013) (Wardlaw & Callahan, JJ.,
concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (stating “Rules 12 and 56 . . . provide various theories
upon which a suit may disposed of before trial. California’s anti-SLAPP statute, by creating a
separate and additional theory upon which certain kinds of suits may be disposed of before trial,
supplements rather than conflicts with the Federal Rules”); Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 86 (1st
Cir. 2010) (noting neither Rule 12(b)(6) nor 56 “was meant to control the particular issues under
[the anti-SLAPP statute] before the district court”).
206 See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 18 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (highlighting that
any Rule which effectively alters or introduces public policy must be supported by “explicit legislation”).
207 See Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (explaining that a case’s outcome
should not be affected by whether it was filed in federal court or state court).
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in federal court would effectively nullify their protection. But as preemption
analysis has shown, the purposes behind anti-SLAPP statutes do not conflict with
those of Federal Rules 12(b)(6) and 56. Hence, because the two can coexist, there
is no need to preclude anti-SLAPP motions in federal court.
Justice Stevens and the Shady Grove dissenters noted the need to balance
concerns about the Federal Rules with those of state policy. By requiring
courts to consider the policies underlying the Federal Rules and state statutes
that utilize procedure to advance substantive goals, preemption analysis gives
courts an opportunity to discern more carefully the scope of the Rules. And
as the situation with anti-SLAPP statutes shows, using straightforward
preemption analysis helps courts weigh competing interests, rather than
wading directly into difficult Enabling Act questions.
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